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Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

Pycia, Marek; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 287-329

The allocation and exchange of discrete resources, such as transplant organs, public housing, dormitory rooms, and many … our construction to show what can and what cannot be achieved in a variety of allocation and exchange problems, and we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010070

An impossibility theorem in matching problems

Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2006

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332209

On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism

Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu - 2012

-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) has played a central role not only in theory but also in important practical applications …-proposing deferred acceptance-Mechanismus (DA) spielt eine zentrale Rolle nicht nur in der Theorie sondern auch in wichtigen praktischen …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309612

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas - 2019

Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290339

School Choice and Loss Aversion

Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799779

Improving Transparency and Verifiability in School Admissions: Theory and Experiment

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023

Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467863

A theory of school choice lotteries

Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548

Constrained school choice: An experimental study

Haeringer, Guillaume; Calsamiglia, Caterina; Klijn, Flip - 2009

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279488

Adjusting prices in the many-to-many assignment game

Sotomayor, Marilda - 2008

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284074

House allocation with overlapping agents: A dynamic mechanism design approach

Kurino, Morimitsu - 2009

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for … introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping agents. In terms of dynamic mechanism design, we examine two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267121