We formulate a general model and stability notion for two-sided pairwise matching problems with individually … existing continuum matching models and stability notions with transferable utility as special cases of our model and stability … notion. In contrast to finite agent matching models, stable matchings exist under a general class of externalities. This …

Suppose that the agents of a matching market contact each other randomly and form new pairs if is in their interest …. Does such a process always converge to a stable matching if one exists? If so, how quickly? Are some stable matchings more …. The second part of the paper proposes new techniques to analyse the behaviour of matching markets. We introduce the Stable …

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale …-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers …) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense … and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching …

interpretation of these results for matching games. Finally we consider an even more general setting where players' contributions in … in many practical applications, such as NRMP (National Resident Matching Program). …

structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these …

-sided matching markets, such as school choice, labour markets and kidney exchange, relies on both theory as well as on empirical …The Nobel prize in economics in 2012 was awarded to Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E. Roth for 'the theory of stable … foundations of the theory of stable allocations (in particular the celebrated deferred-acceptance algorithm) as well as the …

-liability (JL) to individual liabil- ity (IL) lending models. This article tests a theory explaining this shift, focusing on … borrowers matching into groups exposed to similar economic shocks under JL, diminishing its effectiveness. I reconcile …

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching … opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two … allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static …

unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching. …