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We study the optimal pricing problem of a firm facing customers with limited attention and capability to process … firm's price optimization problem and characterize the pricing and revenue implications of customer's limited attention. We … heterogeneity, and study extensions such as multiple products, competition, and joint inventory and pricing decisions. We also show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011438630
We study the optimal pricing problem of a firm facing customers with limited attention and capability to process … firm's price optimization problem and characterize the pricing and revenue implications of customer's limited attention. We … heterogeneity, and study extensions such as multiple products, competition, and joint inventory and pricing decisions. We also show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011595110
This contribution provides a game theoretical derivation of market demand as a function of the level and distribution of income in the considered economy: if (i) the price is low, everyone buys the good; if (ii ) the price is high, only the rich buy the good (a status good in a narrow sense). If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270373
We show how information acquisition costs can be identified using observable choice data. Identifying information costs from behavior is especially relevant when these costs depend on factors-such as time, effort, and cognitive resources-that are difficult to observe directly, as in models of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010080
In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are simple and types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so-called Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set and Bayesian estimators on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319996
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272564
I consider a situation, where the agent can acquire payoff-relevant information either before or after the contract is signed. To raise efficiency, the principal might solicit information; to retain all surplus, however, she must prevent precontractual information gathering. The following class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293370
This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334005
This study examines the moderating effects of national culture dimensions (Hofstede 1980) on three key elements in the development of organisational learning culture: information acquisition, information interpretation and behavioral and cognitive changes. Data were collected from 1333 companies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369053
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444292