Operationelle Risiken stellen für Banken nach dem Kreditrisiko die zweitwichtigste Risikokategorie dar. Ein effektives Risikomanagement der operationellen Risiken dürfte in Zukunft ein entscheidender Wettbewerbsfaktor sein. Im Rahmen der Neuregelung der bankaufsichtsrechtlichen Vorgaben...

Banking supervision requires regular inspection and assessment of financial institutions. In Germany this task is carried out by the central bank ('Deutsche Bundesbank, BBK') in cooperation with the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority ('Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,...

This paper analyzes central bank policies on monitoring banks in distress when liquidity provisions are conditional on performance and a bad shock occurs. A sequential game model is used to analyze two policies: one in which the central bank acts with discretion and the second in which the...

Basel II changes risk management in banks strongly. Internal rating procedures would lead one to expect that banks are changing over to active risk control. But, if risk management is no longer a simple "game against nature", if all agents involved are active players then a shift from a...

We model 1927-1997 U.S. business failure rates using a time series approach based on unobserved components. Clear evidence is found of cyclical behavior in default rates. The cycle has a period of around 10 years. We also detect longer term movements in default probabilities and default...

We analyze how time-varying bank-specific capital requirements a ect banks' balance sheet adjustments as well as bank lending to the non-financial corporate sector. To do so, we relate Pillar 2 capital requirements to bank balance sheet data, a fully documented corporate credit register and firm...

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks' balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the...

We introduce banks, modeled as in Diamond and Rajan (JoF 2000 or JPE 2001), into a standard DSGE model and use this framework to study the role of banks in the transmission of shocks, the effects of monetary policy when banks are exposed to runs, and the interplay between monetary policy and...

Banks' leverage choices represent a delicate balancing act. Credit discipline argues for more leverage, while balance-sheet opacity and ease of asset substitution argue for less. Meanwhile, regulatory safety nets promote ex post financial stability, but also create perverse incentives for banks...