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On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - 2007

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272596

The theory of implementation of social choice rules

Serrano, Roberto - 2003

agents in society. The implementation problem is then formulated: under what circumstances can one design a mechanism so that …. The theory of implementation or mechanism design formalizes this “social engineering” problem and provides answers to the … question just posed. I survey the theory of implementation in this article, emphasizing the results based on two behavioral …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318948

Strategic pricing of financial options

Bieta, Volker; Broll, Udo; Milde, Hellmuth; Siebel, Wilfried - 2009

The mainstream model of option pricing is based on an exogenously given process of price movements. The implication of this assumption is that price movements are not affected by actions of market participants. However, if we assume that there are indeed impacts on the price movements it no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301361

Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry

Ville, Korpela - 2016

We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result … (1999) 23-38.], and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503061

Thegeneralized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2005

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ?early? and a group of players who choose ?late?. Only the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261378

Equilibrium Delay and Non-existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games

Britz, Volker; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; … - 2014

We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753260

Sharp identification regions in games

Beresteanu, Arie; Molchanov, Ilya; Molinari, Francesca - 2008

. We show that calculating the sharp identification region using our characterization is computationally feasible. We also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288446

An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - 2009

is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272572

Does bargaining matter in the small firm matching model?

L'Haridon, Olivier; Malherbet, Franck; Pérez-Duarte, … - 2010

In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment. To the best of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274621

Robustness of intermediate agreements for the discrete Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - 2012

These notes consist of two parts. In the first one I present a counter example to Proposition 3 of Anbarci & Sun (2013). In the second part I propose a correction based on an axiom similar to one used by Salonen (1988) in the first axomatization of the Discrete Raiffa solution.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319968