The lack of reference price information is often regarded as one of the most pervasive aspect of incomplete commodity markets in developing countries. Previous studies on the effects of price information emphasize the market participation and performance of rural households. This paper argues...

Introduction and Aims Entrepreneurship and the business environment, in general, are being influenced by the existence of formal and informal institutions. This study focuses on the negative versus positive perceptions of Moroccan, Chinese, and German entrepreneurs to formal and informal...

The aim of this research is to analyze the relationship between formal and informal institutions with transaction costs (bargaining and monitoring) of coffee growers in the State of Mexico. For this purpose, a measurement instrument was constructed based on a literature review and the...

We develop a formula for the optimal size of a joint savings association between individuals who share the same financial goal and who can save towards that goal at the same rate. Our motivating example and the core of our analysis is a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA). We measure...

We develop a formula for the optimal size of a joint savings association between individuals who share the same financial goal and who can save towards that goal at the same rate. Our motivating example and the core of our analysis is a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA). We measure...

The present paper explores how implementation of digital technologies (DTs) assists firms in transition economies in addressing weaknesses of the institutional environment surrounding them, in particular via establishment of collective governance systems. Based on case studies of three...

Collusive agreements in the form of cartels among firms are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on prices and sales quotas that are legally not enforceable. Market characteristics that foster cartels' failure or success are widely examined. However, the interplay between the...

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of...

Using firm-level data from nine developing countries we demonstrate that (a) certain institutions like restrictive labour market regulations that are considered to be bad for economic growth might be beneficial for production efficiency, whereas (b) good business environment which is considered...

Do contractual institutions and a country's level of trust interact in their impact on the international make-or-buy decision? By analyzing explicit and implicit contracting in a unified framework, I show that better formal contractibility may both facilitate and hinder relational contracting on...