We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...

Procurement practices are affected by uncertainty regarding suppliers' costs, the nature of competition among suppliers, and uncertainty regarding possible collusion among suppliers. Buyers dissatisfied with bids of incumbent suppliers can cancel their procurements and resolicit bids after...

In general, the result of the elimination of weakly dominated strategies depends on order. We define nice weak dominance. Under nice weak dominance, order does not matter. We identify an important class of games under which nice weak dominance and weak dominance are equivalent, and so order...

This paper uses results of lattice theory, convex analysis, and nonsmooth analysis to establish conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when payoff functions are continuous but not quasi-concave. A class of economic games for which this theory is important is given.

We consider the dynamic private provision of funds to a project that generates a flow of public benefits. Examples include fund drives for public television or university buildings. The games we study have complete information about payoffs, allow each player to contribute each period, and let...

In many markets, homogenous goods and services are sold both by large global frms and small local frms. Surprisingly, the large frms charge, often substantially, higher prices. Examples include hotels, airlines, and coffee shops. This paper provides a parsimonious model that can account for...

Mechanisms where sellers set the price and are charged a linear commission fee are widely used by real world intermediaries, e.g. by real estate brokers. Empirically these commission fees exhibit very little variance, both across heterogeneous regional markets and over time. So far, there is no...

We consider general asset market environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs are endowed with objects and have demands for other agents' objects. We show that if all agents have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, the VCG transfer of each agent is...

Mechanisms where intermediaries charge a commission fee and have the sellers set the price are widely used in practice e.g. by real estate agents, stock brokers, art galleries, or auction houses. We model competition between intermediaries in a dynamic random matching model, where in every...

We analyze the competitive e?ects of backward vertical integration by a partially vertically integrated ?rm that competes with non-integrated ?rms both upstream and downstream. We show that vertical integration is procompetitive under fairly general conditions. It can be anticompetitive only if...