We consider the trade-off between talking and listening in a laboratory experiment where two team members need to coordinate on the use of an information channel. Each team member indicates their preference to "talk" and share her own information with her teammate, or to "listen" and obtain...

This paper experimentally examines the selection of equilibria in dynamic games. Our baseline treatment is a two-state extension of an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, which we modify in series of treatments to study the focality of efficiency and symmetry, the effect dynamic and...

Accounting for sample selection is a challenge not only for empirical researchers, but also for the agents populating our models. Yet most models abstract from these issues and assume that agents successfully tackle selection problems. We design an experiment where a person who understands...

In dynamic environments where the strategic setting evolves across time, the specific rule governing the transitions can substantially alter the incentives agents face. This is particularly true when history-dependent strategies are used. In a laboratory study, we examine whether subjects...

We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender–one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...

This article reports on a field study that has been conducted in the online computer game World of Warcraft. In a basic labor situation a principal gives an upfront wage to an agent (who is unaware that he is participating in an experiment) and asks him to conduct a real-effort task. The unique...