We consider the economy consisting of n agents and m heterogenous objects where the seller benefits v from objects. Our study focuses on the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). In the situation with arbitrary n, m and...

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015),...

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-waste fulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of...

This study explores two key factors influencing subjects' deviation from domi- nant bidding in Vickrey auction experiments. The first factor examines subjects' understanding of strategy-proofness (SP), while the second focuses on "human interaction" which includes social preferences (spite and...

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof...

This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering...

We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question...

Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...

Several Japanese local governments started to add endogenous minimum prices to firstprice auctions in their public procurements. Any bid less than the endogenous minimum price is referred to as abnormally low and is excluded from the procurement procedure. The endogenous minimum price is...

We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the...