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Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: Experts vs. quacks

Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012140661

Trust and Reputation under Asymmetric Information

Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020

information about the multiplier. We discuss potential reasons for the deviation between theory and experimental data. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012287806

Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment

Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475

I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189075

Information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle

Mäkinen, Taneli; Ohl, Björn - 2012

We study firms' incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to understand the role of endogenous information in explaining asymmetric business cycles. When the economy has been in a boom in the previous period, and firms enter the current period with an optimistic belief,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281437

Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

Jäger, Gerhard; Koch-Metzger, Lars; Riedel, Frank - 2009

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272564

Wealth as a signal in the search model of money

Okumura, Tsunao - 2005

This paper investigates the possibility that wealth (holdings of money) serves as a signal of ability to produce high quality products for agents who cannot directly observe the quality of the products. A producer's wealth may advertise past success in selling products to agents who knew the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266277

Vanity in Politics: A Problem?

Suurmond, Guido; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2002

Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324778

The El Farol problem revisited

Böhm, Volker - 2015

The so-called El Farol problem describes a prototypical situation of interacting agents making binary choices to participate in a non-cooperative environment or to stay by themselves and choosing an outside option. In a much cited paper Arthur (1994) argues that persistent on-converging...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282342

Imitation and Experimentation in a Changing Environment

Squintani, Francesco; Valimaki, Juuso - 1999

This paper analyzes the equilibrium play in a random matching model with a changing environment. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strategies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play in the population. If the players are patient,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236087

Tit for others' tat: Repeated prisoner's dilemma experiments with third-party monitoring and indirect punishment

Bruttel, Lisa; Güth, Werner - 2013

Two pairs of two participants each interact repeatedly in two structurally independent but informationally linked Prisoner´s Dilemma games. Neither pair receives feedback about past choices by their own partner but is fully informed about the choices by the other pair. Considering this as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369321