This paper examines the learning dynamics of boundedly rational agents, who are asked to voluntarily contribute to a … striking differences between strategies played in the two games are confirmed by simulations, where the learning process is …

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP … equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …

results are extended to a model of learning, in which type k plays a k times iterated best response the average of past play …

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 … order shown by Selten and Chmura. This result supports our view that learning in networks is different from learning in …

where both risky arms are of the same type, we find that learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium if the …

simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled learning process in such environments that leads to stable and … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

learning process of purely and impurely altruistic agents and find that in both cases the contribution level converges towards … corresponds to findings from experiments on voluntary contribution to a public good. Crucial determinants of the learning process …

metaphor for social learning. This paper will face the question what an economist can learn from the mathematical branch of … genetic algorithm learning is a compound of three different learning schemes. First, every particular scheme is analyzed. Then … it will be pointed out that it is the combination of the three schemes that gives genetic algorithm learning its special …