Regulators restrict bankers' risk-taking by bonus caps or deferrals. We derive a structural model to analyze these compensation regulations and show that for a risk-neutral banker subject to positive switching costs of reducing bank risk, a bonus deferral is impotent while a sufficiently tight...

This paper investigates the price and service rate decisions in a customer-intensive service in an M/M/1 queue system under the influence of social interactions, where a higher value of the service is perceived if more customers purchase the service. The customer-intensive nature of the service...

The present SUERF Study includes a selection of papers based on the authors’ contributions to the Helsinki conference, jointly organized by SUERF,and Bank of Finland on 3 July,2015.

The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 has given rise to new regulatory initiatives to put restrictions on the size and term of bankers' pay. We revisit the question whether these regulations are justified, both theoretically and empirically. We model bonuses as a series of sequential call...