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The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261115
The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We fill this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013164118
The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We fill this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013285525
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927
We study firms' incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to understand the role of endogenous information in explaining asymmetric business cycles. When the economy has been in a boom in the previous period, and firms enter the current period with an optimistic belief,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281437
candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264587
candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269296
candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277508
Although the literature on assignment mechanisms emphasizes the importance of efficiency based on agents' preferences, policymakers may want to achieve different goals. For instance, school districts may want to affect student learning outcomes but must take teacher welfare into account when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014480502
In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403444