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Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz; Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; … - 2018

, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011798971

Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms

Schmelzer, André - 2016

This paper experimentally studies an essential institutional feature of matching markets: Randomization of allocation … fairness perceptions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522113

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas - 2019

Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290339

School Choice and Loss Aversion

Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799779

Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness

Meisner, Vincent - 2021

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012653514

A theory of school choice lotteries

Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two … notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548

Constrained school choice: An experimental study

Haeringer, Guillaume; Calsamiglia, Caterina; Klijn, Flip - 2009

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279488

Family ties: School assignment with siblings

Dur, Umut Mert; Morrill, Thayer; Phan, William - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 1, pp. 89-120

We introduce a generalization of the school choice problem motivated by the following observations: students are assigned to grades within schools, many students have siblings who are applying as well, and school districts commonly guarantee that siblings will attend the same school. This last...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189067

School choice with hybrid schedules

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz; Dur, Umut Mert; Harris, William - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-11

classrooms initially reserved for each grade and enables possible efficiency gains by swapping classrooms across grades. Moreover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200099

Non-standard choice in matching markets

Caspari, Gian; Khanna, Manshu - 2022

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013464276