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Competition, cooperation, and collective choice

Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2012

economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283979

Motives of sanctioning: Equity and emotions in a public good experiment with punishment

Crosetto, Paolo; Güth, Werner; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, … - 2012

We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291837

Parametric contest success functions

Rai, Birendra K.; Sarin, Rajiv - 2007

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. We provide an axiomatization of two parametric families of CSF's. In the first, the winning probability of each agent depends on the investments and a vector of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265674

Generalized contest success functions

Rai, Birendra K.; Sarin, Rajiv - 2007

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263839

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Weikard, Hans-Peter - 2005

Previous work on the formation and stability of cartels has focused on the case of identical players. This assumption is very restrictive in many economic environments. This paper analyses stability of cartels in games with heterogeneous players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312346

Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2007

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264689

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - 2009

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277486

Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment

Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731

Competitive Careers as a Way to Mediocracy

Kräkel, Matthias - 2009

highest incentives to succeed in career contests. This detrimental incentive effect exists irrespective of whether effort and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333803

Effort Maximization in Asymmetric N-person Contest Games

Franke, Jörg; Kanzow, Christian; Leininger, Wolfgang; … - 2009

This paper provides existence and characterization of the optimal contest success function under the condition that the objective of the contest designer is total effort maximization among n heterogeneous players. Heterogeneity of players makes active participation of a player in equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265789