Public school choice often yields student placements that are neither fair nor efficient. Kesten (2010) proposed an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (EADAM) that allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignment. In this article, we provide...

This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no sanction, debarment and fines. The model's predictions...

How fair are government decisions based on algorithmic predictions? And to what extent can the government delegate decisions to machines without sacrificing procedural fairness? Using a set of vignettes in the context of predictive policing, school admissions, and refugee-matching, we explore...

This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of applicants under two of the most commonly used school admissions procedures: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism,...

Privacy law relies on the argument that consent does not entail any relevant impediments for the liberty of the consenting individual. Challenging this argument, we experimentally investigate whether consent to the publication of personal information in cyberspace entails self-coercion on a...

Recent advances in AI create possibilities for delegating legal decision-making to machines or enhancing human adjudication through AI assistance. Using classic normative conflicts - the trolley problem and similar moral dilemmas - as a proof of concept, we examine the alignment between AI legal...

Why do people obey the law when it is not formally enforced? In this study, we explore the expressive power of democracy as a behavioral channel of compliance with the law. Using a modified version of the stealing game, we examine the effect of two distinct democratic interventions on stealing...

We design and implement the first real-effort experiment that can jointly estimate present bias (Ø) and sophistication (bØ), with separate preference parameters for money (Øm, bØm) and effort (Øe, bØe). In our study, participants chose to (and predicted to) complete 14% (and 10%) fewer...

Justification for policies to encourage investments in education, particularly for individuals at the lower end of the ability distribution, may be provided by behavioural economics. We present a prototypical model where individuals who are potentially loss averse around their expected outcome...

The model of time-inconsistent procrastination by O'Donoughe and Rabin shows that individuals who are not aware of their present-bias (naïve) procrastinate more than individuals who are aware of it (sophisticated) or are not present-biased (time-consistent). This paper tests this prediction. We...