In a general equilibrium model with a continuum of traders and bounded aggregate endowment, I investigate the Market Selection Hypothesis that markets favor traders with accurate beliefs. Contrary to known results for economies with (only) finitely many traders, I find that risk attitudes affect...

The wisdom of the crowd applied to financial markets asserts that prices represent a consensus belief that is more accurate than individual beliefs. However, a market selection argument implies that prices eventually reflect only the beliefs of the most accurate agent. In this paper, we show how...

Humans differ in their strategic reasoning abilities and in beliefs about others’ strategic reasoning abilities. Studying such cognitive hierarchies has produced new insights regarding equilibrium analysis in economics. This paper investigates the effect of cognitive hierarchies on long run...

Agency may be exercised by different entities (e.g., individuals, firms, households). A given individual can form part of multiple agents (e.g., he may belong to a firm and a household). The set of agents that act in a given situation might not be common knowledge. We adapt the standard model of...

Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces....