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We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity - i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013483496
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity - i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197547
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex ante. However, we show that there is no mechanism that is likewise (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014282724
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316052
We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the … assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208670
Human decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing mo-tivations that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength and circumstances. Over-stylizing" neglects such competing concerns and context-dependence, although it facilitates the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275040
This paper extends the analysis of liberal principles in social choice recently proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009a) to infinitely-lived societies. First, a novel characterisation of the inegalitarian leximax social welfare relation is provided based on the Individual Benefit Principle,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280774
Vorschlägen eine Budgetaufteilung (Allokation) bestimmt wird. Von besonderem Interesse ist die Frage, welche Abstimmungsregeln … nicht manipulierbar sind, das heißt für keinen Agenten einen Anreiz bieten, eine Allokation vorzuschlagen, die nicht mit … diese Verfahren als auch andere Abstimmungsregeln zur Allokation öffentlicher Güter sind, wenn man die weitaus größere …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011889538
We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. We provide a new concept of fairness, called position-wise envy-freeness, that is compatible with individual rationality. This new concept requires...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011421471
People often act out of a desire to be responsible for good and not for bad events. Similarly, people frequently reward and punish other people if they perceive them to be responsible for the implementation of events that they like or dislike. When the implementation of an event depends on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013427684