This paper studies intertemporal social preferences. We introduce intertemporal dictator and ultimatum games where players decide on the timing of monetary payoffs. The setting is two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional, in the sense that inequalities can arise in the time as well as in the...

Anecdotally, physical activity appears to be a textbook example of time inconsistency, which is the failure to follow through on ex-ante preferences and plans. Interestingly, our longitudinal survey finds that, over a fortnight, exercising more than preferred/planned is actually more prevalent...

We consider financial networks where agents are linked to each other via mutual liabilities. In case of bankruptcy, there are potentially many bankruptcy rules, ways to distribute the assets of a bankrupt agent over the other agents. One common approach is to first apply pairwise netting of...

A firm has liabilities towards a group of creditors. We analyze the question of how to distribute the asset value of the firm among the creditors and the firm itself. Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied in the game theory literature, we introduce the firm as an explicit player and...

In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the most popular solutions. While it is a fundamentally static concept, the consideration of a sequential extension of the underlying dominance correspondence gave rise to a selection of non-empty...

We study bankruptcy problems in financial networks in the presence of general bankruptcy laws. The set of clearing payment matrices is shown to be a lattice, whichguarantees the existence of a greatest and a least clearing payment. Multiplicity ofclearing payment matrices is both a theoretical...

We consider financial networks where agents are linked to each other with financial contracts. A centralized clearing mechanism collects the initial endowments, the liabilities and the division rules of the agents and determines the payments to be made. A division rule specifies how the assets...

We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set...

When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibria are constrained suboptimal, and there is scope for Pareto improving interventions. Price regulation, which operates anonymously, on market variables, can be such a Pareto improving policy, even when the welfare effects of rationing are...

At arbitrary prices of commodities and assets, fix-price equilibria exist under weak assumptions: endowments need not satisfy an interiority condition, utility functions need only satisfy a very weak monotonicity requirement, and the asset return matrix allows for redundant assets. Prices of...