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Interactive Unawareness and Speculative Trade

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2003

, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on unawareness proposed this far in the … literature. In an example of speculative trade, we demonstrate how mutual unawareness of fundamentals allows for common knowledge … standard information structures with strong properties of knowledge. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263088

Unawareness, Beliefs and Games

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2007

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276586

Unawareness, beliefs and games

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276636

Incomplete-information models of large economies with anonymity: Existence and uniqueness of common priors

Hellwig, Martin - 2011

The paper provides a specification of belief systems for models of large economies with anonymity in which aggregate states depend only on cross-section distributions of types. For belief systems satisfying certain conditions of mutual absolute continuity, the paper gives a necessary and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286705

The penalty-duel and institutional design: is there a Neeskens-effect?

Leininger, Wolfgang; Ockenfels, Axel - 2008

No abstract available

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264282

The bail-out! Positive political economics of greek-type crises in the EMU

Fahrholz, Christian; Wójcik, Cezary - 2010

The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that i) the bail-out was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it was irrational and iii) the bail-out will create a moral hazard problem. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU's present...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274897

The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lison: A game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU

Lechner, Susanne; Ohr, Renate - 2008

The ways of decision making within the EU have significantly changed in the last decades: the rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300191

A Positive Framework to Analyze Sovereign Bail-outs within the EMU

Fahrholz, Christian; Wójcik, Cezary - 2011

We propose a positive formal framework for analyzing sovereign bail-outs in the context of the European Monetary Union (EMU) with a view to making policy recommendations regarding improvements to the EMU institutional architecture. We build our analysis on a political economic game-theoretic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334489

Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

van Damme, Eric; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1999

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334682

Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs

Weibull, Jörgen W.; van Damme, Eric - 1998

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334690