This paper studies the strategic foundations of the Representative Voter Theorem (Rothstein, 1991), also called the second version of the Median Voter Theorem. As a by-product, it also considers the existence of non-trivial strategy-proof social choice functions over the domain of...

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sönmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for a fixed number of periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period;...

Social choice models usually assume that choice is among exogenously given and non decomposable alternatives. Often, on the contrary, choice is among objects that are constructed by individuals or institutions as complex bundles made of many interdependent components. In this paper we present a...

Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...

We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...

We model a general choice environment via probabilistic choice correspondences, with (possibly) incomplete domain and infinite universal set of alternatives. We offer a consistency restriction regarding choice when the feasible set contracts. This condition, 'contraction consistency', subsumes...

We study how an optimal income tax and an optimal public-goods provision rule respond to preference and productivity shocks. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. We therefore extend the Mirrleesian...

It is well known that the literature on judgment aggregation inherits the impossibility results from the aggregation of preferences that it generalises. This is due to the fact that the typical judgment aggregation problem induces an ultrafilter on the the set of individuals, as was shown in a...

This paper studies collective decision making with regard to convex risk measures: It addresses the question whether there exist nondictatorial aggregation functions of convex risk measures satisfying Arrow-type rationality axioms (weak universality, systematicity, Pareto principle). Herein,...