This article introduces a social planner version of a model central to the New Economic Geography for explicitly answering whether the symmetric equilibrium outcome of the decentralized market economy is socially desirable. We find that savings incentives are too weak, resulting in an...

In this work, we reconsider the dynamics of a few versions of the classical Samuelson's multiplier-accelerator model for national economy. First we recall that the classical one with constant governmental expenditure, represented by a linear second-order difference equation, is able to generate...

We present a simple financial market model with interacting chartists and fundamentalists. Since some of these speculators only become active when a certain misalignment level has been crossed, the dynamics are driven by a discontinuous piecewise linear map. The model endogenously generates...

We develop a financial market model with interacting chartists and fundamentalists that embeds the famous bull and bear market model of Huang and Day as a special case. Their model is given by a one-dimensional continuous piecewise-linear map. Our model, on the other hand, is more flexible and...

We introduce financial frictions in a two sector model of international trade with heterogeneous agents. The level of specialization in the economy (economic development) depends on the quality of financial institutions. Underdeveloped financial markets prohibit an economy to specialize in...

We develop a small, open economy, two-sector model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous participation in a labor matching market. We analyze the implications of asymmetric market entry costs for the patterns of international trade and underemployment. Furthermore, we examine the welfare...

We develop a two-sector, two-country model where trade is driven by technological differences. Each country is populated by large number of heterogeneous workers distinguished by their level of skills. Given that one country has a technological advantage in the skilled intensive good when we...

In the financial economics literature debt contracts provide efficient solutions for addressing managerial moral hazard problems. We analyze a model with multiple projects where the manager obtains private information about their quality after the contract with investors is agreed. The...

We study the formation of networks in environments where agents derive benefits from other agents directly linked to them but suffer losses through contagion when any agent on a path connected to them is hit by a shock. We first consider networks with undirected links (e.g. epidemics,...

We study the formation of networks in environments where agents derive benefits from other agents directly linked to them but suffer losses through contagion when any agent on a path connected to them is hit by a shock. We first consider networks with undirected links (e.g. epidemics,...