This paper presents an approach for resilience incentives in the regulation of electricity network operators. Resilience is the ability of the power system to deal quickly and efficiently with large-scale and long-lasting power interruptions. It comprises two related aspects: minimizing the...

Market design for electricity often ignores network congestion initially and addresses it in a second, so-called 'redispatch' stage. For market participants, any two-stage design offers an opportunity to strategically optimize between the different market stages. The current debate is how to...

Following liberalization and especially the energy transition, energy infrastructures are developing rapidly and significantly. Electricity networks are expanded to facilitate connection of renewable energies and new load such as heat pumps and electric mobility. On the one hand, gas networks...

The electricity grid includes multiple network areas managed by different operators, with transmission system operators (TSOs) handling high-voltage areas and distribution system operators managing midto low-voltage areas. These areas are interconnected and synchronized, creating classical...

Im Fokus des Projektvorhabens stand der Umgang mit stranded asset Risiken im Bereich der Gasnetze, die sich durch die neuen politischen Rahmenbedingungen zur Klimaneutralität bis 2045 ergeben. Basierend auf einer Analyse der international bereits umgesetzten Ansätze zur Adressierung des...

Stromspeicher erscheinen derzeit vor allem in Form von Multi-Use-Speichern wirtschaftlich darstellbar, die nach Bedarf für Netzzwecke eingesetzt werden und um am Strommarkt Handelserlöse zur erzielen. Die technischen Anforderungen aus Netzsicht erfordern in der Regel, dass die Initiative für...

Diese Studie untersucht die internationalen Erfahrungen mit marktbasiertem Redispatch. Der Fokus liegt auf zwei Ausprägungen von strategischem Verhalten: der Ausübung von Marktmacht und dem so genannten Inc-dec gaming. Dabei kommt die Untersuchung zu zwei zentralen Aussagen. Erstens, in der...

We analyse incentive problems in coordination of network operators that purchase services for electricity networks from distributed resources. Such services are often associated with externalities that make the social optimum costly against the individual one. However, a costly reaction of other...

Market-based redispatch is efficient in short-run but provides perverse long-run incentives. This paper explains such incentives by distribution effects of the tool. Therefore, market-based redispatch is conceptualized as a Coasean bargaining about network capacity. This allows altering...