We study the effect of diminishing search frictions in markets with adverse selection by presenting a model in which agents with private information can simultaneously contact multiple trading partners. We highlight a new trade-off: facilitating contacts reduces coordination frictions but also...

We study the effect of diminishing search frictions in markets with adverse selection by presenting a model in which agents with private information can simultaneously contact multiple trading partners. We highlight a new trade- off: facilitating contacts reduces coordination frictions but also...

We study directed search equilibria in a decentralized market with adverse selection, where uninformed buyers post general trading mechanisms and informed sellers select one of them. We show that this has differing and significant implications with respect to the traditional approach, based on...

We study the role of traders' meeting capacities in decentralized markets with adverse selection. Uninformed customers choose trading mechanisms in order to find a provider for a service. Providers are privately informed about their quality and aim to match with one of the customers. We consider...

This paper studies sequential information acquisition by an ambiguity-averse decision maker (DM), who decides how long to collect information before taking an irreversible action. The agent optimizes against the worst-case belief and updates prior by prior. We show that the consideration of...

We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave...

A buyer makes an offer to a privately informed seller for a good of uncertain quality. Quality determines both the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation, and the buyer evaluates each contract according to its worst-case performance over a set of probability distributions. This paper...

We study the market interaction between financial intermediaries and retail investors, who not only face uncertainty about the performance of the different investments but also have limited awareness of the available investment opportunities. Intermediaries compete for investors via the menu of...

We consider a dynamic economy in which agents are initially unaware of some risks. As awareness of these risks emerges, markets re-open so agents can re-optimize and purchase insurance. An inefficiency may nonetheless arise as the cost of insurance is not spread over time. This "savings mistake"...

We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also has superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. The agent decides which of the available actions to reveal and...