In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, wie Unternehmen ihre Organisation anpassen, wenn sie erstmalig an die Börse gehen (initial public offering, IPO). Im Zuge des Börsengangs wandeln sich Unternehmen in eine hierarchischere Organisation um und verstärken die Aufsicht durch das Management....

We propose a novel measure for workers' financial incentives based on withinestablishment wage differences among similar workers from the same occupation. This measure captures all forms of incentive pay that lead to workeremployer-specific pay premiums, including explicit (e.g., bonuses) and...

We examine how firms adapt their organization when they go public. To conform with the requirements of public capital markets, we expect IPO firms to become more organized, making the firm more accountable and its human capital more easily replaceable. We find that IPO firms transform into a...

This paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and take-over defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly...

We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed 'hard' information about the board's...

We test recent theories of when companies go public which predict that 1) more companies will go public when outside valuations are high or have increased, 2) companies prefer going public when uncertainty about their future profitability is high, and 3) firms whose controlling shareholders...