In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result...

Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper studies the role of open and closed committee decision making in presence of external influence. We show that restricting the information of interest groups may reduce the bias...

This paper presents a positive theory of centralization of political decisions in an international union. My central claim is that lobbies play a role in determining the assignment of competencies to the union because their power of influence can increase or decrease under centralization. I show...

This document presents the key developments and results of REFIT, the Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme. It also contains detailed information on the first 22 REFIT Platform opinions and the way in which the Commission intends to follow up on these.

Some regulation is needed to enhance growth and economic welfare, but too much undermines productivity. Generally, the UK seems lightly regulated, especially in its international transactions, and it has a public enterprise sector small in both size and scope. Yet British business has become...