In this paper we propose the infimum of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion as a measure of global risk aversion of a utility function. We then show that, for any given arbitrary pair of distributions, there exists a threshold level of global risk aversion such that all increasing...

We present a model in which an individual's sentiments towards others are determined endogenously on the basis of how they perform relative to the societal average. This, in turn, affects the individual's own behavior and hence other agents' sentiments toward her. We focus on stationary patterns...

In Esteban and Ray (1999) we formalize a model in which individuals lobby before the government in order to benefit from some productivity enhancing government action (infrastructure, direct subsidies, permissions, in short). The government honestly tries to allocate these permissions to the...

The Olson Paradox referes to the observation that larger groups may be less successful in furthering their interests. We address the paradox within an explicit game-theoretic model of lobbying.

In this paper we study the role of lobbying as a form of political participation which conveys information to the governmenton the value attached by each player (individual, sector, region) toreceiving a permission.

We introduce an extension of the Esteban and Ray [Econometrica, 1994] measure of polarization which can be applied to two types of databases:(i) data for which a density function for the income distribution has already be computed (either parametrically or non-parametrically); and (ii) data...

In this short paper, we ask the following question: Why is lobbying so endemic in societies? Put another way, might it not be possible to design a social decision rule that assigns to each group its equilibrium probability of success, and sidestep the inefficient waste of resources that results...