The largest market in national economies is the labor market. Labor market contracting is characterized by job search, often from unknown wage offer distributions. This paper reports experimental tests of finite horizon models of job search in which the wage offer distribution is unknown....

Both mainstream economics and its critics have focused on models of individual rational agents even though most important decisions are made by small groups. Little systematic work has been done to study the behavior of small groups as decision-making agents in markets and other strategic games....

We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences. The income distribution and the kindness or unkindness of others' choices ('intentions') systematically affect a person's emotional state. The emotional state systematically affects the marginal rate of substitution between own and...

Endemic congestion at the road landside interface at Port Botany, Sydney results from coordination problems within the supply chain. These problems cannot be solved through the vertical integration of participants in the supply chain because of competition law considerations, and other non-price...

This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of...

We develop and experimentally test a model of endogenous entry, exit, and bidding in common value auctions. The model and experimental design include an alternative profitable activity (a “safe havenâ€) that provides agent-specific opportunity costs of bidding in the auction. Each agent...

Trust and reciprocity have been observed in experiments with simple stylized games. Such characteristics of social preferences have been observed to vary with procedures that alter the social environment in an experiment, such as single blind or double blind payoff protocols. This paper reports...

Can any prominent theory of decision under risk rationalize both small-stakes risk aversion and large-stakes risk aversion? Do some prominent theories fail to rationalize patterns of same-stakes risk aversion? How do reference payoffs enter in the answer to these questions? What would be the...