March 1997 <p> Arrow's ``impossibility'' and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but ``saturating'' domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly)...</p>

Arrow's "impossibility" and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but "saturating" domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly) monotone "economic...

Kenneth J. Arrow's theorem holds when the set of alternatives is an Edgeworth hyperbox and the individuals have classical economic preferences over their consumption sets. (Free disposability is not assumed.) By classical individual preferences the authors mean preorders satisfying continuity,...

Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane, that faces a problem of locating public facilities to be used by its members. The cost of every facility is financed by its users, who also face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We assume that the...

We investigate refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the first refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and GOTCHA sets of...

Arrow's axioms for social welfare functions are shown to be inconsistent when the set of alternatives is the nonnegative orthant in a multidimensional Euclidean space and preferences are assumed to be either the set of analytic classical economic preferences or the set of Euclidean spatial...

In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...

In this article we use the theory of power indices to evaluate the respective influence of the two classes of electors in the polling method introduced by the electoral law of 29 June 1820, known as the law of ?double vote?. We show in a simplified framework that the voting power of the ?major?...