We examine the investment decisions of regulated firms in a sequential-equilibrium model under asymmetric information. The regulator is unable to commit to a pricing policy, unlike mechanism-design models, but sets rates after observing the firm's investment. The information conveyed by the...

J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber examine the justifications for the publicly-protected postal monopoly and its public ownership and control.

J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber examine the justifications for the publicly-protected postal monopoly and its public ownership and control.

The European Court of First Instance, through its decision in <i>Microsoft v. Commission</i>, dealt a one-two punch to incentives to innovate. First, by penalizing Microsoft for bundling its Media Player with Windows, the court will make companies reluctant to add innovative features to their products....

We analyze a fully dynamic model of price competition when firms face a learning curve and the possibility of organizational forgetting. We show that even though the leader firm may underprice the follower and this price difference may grow as the leader's cost advantage widens, the market may...

Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. Previously...