This paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest. We present a permissive result wherein by using just a single...

This paper incorporates social psychology into implementation theory. Real individuals care not only about their material benefits but also about their social influence in terms of obedience and conformity. Using a continuous time horizon, we demonstrate a method of manipulating the...

We investigate implementation of social choice functions as mappings from states to lotteries under complete information. We assume that for every agent, any pair of distinct states induces distinct preferences. A social choice function is called Condorcet-decisive if it always enforces the...

The study of mechanism design is sometimes criticized, because the designed mechanisms depend on the fine detail of the model specification, and agents' behavior relies on the strong common knowledge assumptions on their rationality and others. Hence, the study of 'detail-free' mechanism design...

This paper reconsiders implementation of social choice functions defined as mapping from states to consequences, where we require the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome at every state. In contrast with the standard models, we construct only mechanisms that are universal, i.e., are free from the...

We investigate multiple regions in which coordination games are exclusively played by their participants. For every region, there exist a number of immobile individuals locked into this region. There also exist mobile individuals who look out for chances to move into more beneficial regions, but...

This paper shows a detail-free idea of multi-object large double auction design in general trading environments, where the auctioneer randomly divides agents into two groups, and agents in each group trade at the market-clearing price vector in the other group. With private values, any dominant...

This paper investigates repeated games with perfect monitoring, where the number of repetition is finite, and the discount factor is far less than unity. Players can make a side payment contract, but their liability is severely limited. The history of play may not necessarily be verifiable. With...

The situation in which a decision maker is confronted with decision making problems infinitely many times is considered. She does not know the state-dependent stochastic payoffs, and learns from past experiences according to some adaptive learning rule. She is motivated by the maximization of...

In this paper, we will argue that it is essential to incorporate bounded rationality into game theory. Game theory has been applied to economics such as industrial organization on the basis of the naïve interpretation of game theory, which requires players to be ideally rational in an extremely...