We examine the optimal design of two-stage research and development (R&D) joint ventures. At the second stage, researchers choose R&D effort levels independently in an attempt to achieve an innovation. In the first stage, researchers have an opportunity to share endowments of productive...

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately informed 'monopolistic' insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The...

I contrast equilibria in loan markets under bilateral bank- borrower relationships, in which proprietary technological knowledge of borrowers is not revealed to product-market competitors, with equilibria under multilateral financing which may lead to such knowledge being shared across...

We develop a model of securitized (Originate, then Distribute) lending in which both publicly observed aggregate shocks to values of securitized loan portfolios, and later asymmetrically observed discernment of the qualities of subsets thereof, play crucial roles, as in the recent paper of...