Game theory lacks an explanation of how players' beliefs are formed and why they are in equilibrium. This is the reason why it has failed to make significant advances with the problem of equilibrium selection even for quite siniple games, as 2x2 games with two strict Nash equilibria. Our paper...

We present a new refinement for signalling games: the Introspective Equilibrium. It is based on both a procedure for beliefs formation -called Incentive Dominance- and a global consistence requirement, closely related to that of the Undefeated equilibrium of mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and...

Game theory lacks an explanation of how players' beliefs are formed and why they are in equilibrium. This is the reason why it has failed to make significant advances with the problem of equilibrium selection even for quite simple games, as 2 x 2 games with two strict Nash equilibrium. Our paper...

The aim of this paper is to explain how financial constraints and family background characteristics affect the signalling educational investments of individuals born in low-income families. We show that talented students who are poor are unable to signal their talent, as the maximum level of...

This paper analyses a finitely repeated wage bargaining game, where the union's strike decision is endogenous, but there is incomplete information about his striking strategy space. We characterize the equilibrium path and the equilibrium payoff of all Sequential Equilibria, following the...

This paper deals with the problem of fiscal corresponsability of twogovemment levels in a game theory context. It is assumed that Nash equilibriaof the non-cooperative game between both Govemments are not Pareto optimal.Then, assurning the existence of non-equilibrium strategies, which would...

We present a finitely repeated bargaining game with complete information. The stage game is asimultaneous demand game with a fall-back position for both parties, in which we allow one party(say, the union) to estabilish a credible commitment to strike if it is not offered a determinedwage. We...

This paper analyzes the problems in designing a tax sharing system when there are two governments levels with rights over the same taxes. Using a principal-agent model, the optimality of the different tax sharing systems is discussed. The presence of efficiency problems derived from the lack of...