In this survey we present some of the more significant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce the subject and Section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz (1977) for the case of single-period contracts extended by many...

Efficient contracts for sharing risk will allocate risk according to comparative advantage. When risks meet the typical criteria for insurability, in particular independence, the comparative advantage is straightforward and insurers are able to diversify risk by pooling together many...

Although financial pricing models imply that profits of property- liability insurance firms should conform to an unpredictable time series process, cycles are widely reported. Some controversy exists as to whether the "underwriting cycle" is a mere accounting artifact or whether it has real...

This is a talk, rather than a research or survey paper. Very little of what I say will be original, but I wish to stimulate discussion on a set of issues that arise from the nature of risk and that I consider problematic to our profession. The paper is not exhaustive of references and many of my...

This paper attempts to identify moral hazard in the traditional reinsurance market. We build a multi-period principle agent model of the reinsurance transaction from which we derive predictions on premium design, monitoring, loss control and insurer risk retention. We then use panel data on U.S....