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The authors investigate the implementation of social choice functions that map to lotteries over alternatives. They require virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. Under very weak domain restrictions, they show that if there are three or more players, any social choice...
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This paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest. We present a permissive result wherein by using just a single...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465274
This paper incorporates social psychology into implementation theory. Real individuals care not only about their material benefits but also about their social influence in terms of obedience and conformity. Using a continuous time horizon, we demonstrate a method of manipulating the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465281
We investigate implementation of social choice functions as mappings from states to lotteries under complete information. We assume that for every agent, any pair of distinct states induces distinct preferences. A social choice function is called Condorcet-decisive if it always enforces the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465283
The study of mechanism design is sometimes criticized, because the designed mechanisms depend on the fine detail of the model specification, and agents' behavior relies on the strong common knowledge assumptions on their rationality and others. Hence, the study of 'detail-free' mechanism design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465300
This paper reconsiders implementation of social choice functions defined as mapping from states to consequences, where we require the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome at every state. In contrast with the standard models, we construct only mechanisms that are universal, i.e., are free from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465329
We investigate multiple regions in which coordination games are exclusively played by their participants. For every region, there exist a number of immobile individuals locked into this region. There also exist mobile individuals who look out for chances to move into more beneficial regions, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465333