A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases. First,...

A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm’s stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases....

We study the implementation problem for exchange economies when agents can renegotiate the outcome assigned by the planner and can collude. We focus on the use of sequential mechanisms and present a simple sufficient condition for implementation with renegotiation in strong perfect equilibrium....

In this paper we consider the problem of a principal with many agents who desires to implement a given action profile. Agents observe the actions taken by their colleagues, and this information can be exploited by the principal. Sufficient conditions for implementation under various...

We characterize incentive-efficient merger outcomes when payments can be made both in cash and stock. Each firm has private information about both its stand-alone value and a component of the (possibly negative) potential synergies. We study two cases: when transfers can, and cannot, be made...

Some stock exchanges, such as the Spanish Stock Exchange and Euronext (Paris), allow traders to place orders in a ‘pre-opening’ period. Orders placed in this period are used to determine the opening price, and can be cancelled at any moment and at no cost by the traders. We consider a model...

We analyze the rational expectation equilibria of a delegated port- folio management model in which two risky assets have completely independent returns and liquidity shocks. Some managers have per- fect information on the assets' returns while others are uninformed and try to infer information...