In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government...

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation- that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy,...

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation-that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy,...

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy,...

We examine the validity of one version of the Coase Theorem: In any economy in which property rights are fully allocated, competition will lead to efficient allocations. This version of the theorem implies that the public goods problem can be solved by allocating property rights fully and...

We use an extended Barro-Becker model of endogenous fertility, in which parents are heterogeneous in their labor productivity, to study the efficient degree of consumption inequality in the long run. In our environment a utilitarian planner allows for consumption inequality even when labor...

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