The authors explore the incentives for governments to cooperate by expanding expenditure. They have three countries: two are in a monetary union (the EMU). The labour markets of both the EMU countries are unionized and there is involuntary unemployment in equilibrium. The authors explore the...

We consider a three sector small open economy with a monopolistic non traded sector, a competitive traded good sector, and a capital good sector. In both the consumer good sector, there are enterprise unions that bargain sequentially over wages and employment as in Manning [1987]. This approach...

We consider a three sector small open economy, with a monopolistic non-traded sector, a competitive traded good sector, and a capital goods sector. In both the consumer good sectors, there are enterprise unions that bargain sequentially over wages and employment as in Manning (1987). This...

We explore the incentives for governments to cooperate by expanding expenditure. We model three countries, of which two are in a monetary union (the EU). The labour markets of both EU countries are unionized, and there is involuntary unemployment. We use a general model of bargaining, and...

This paper presents the results of two experiments designed to test violations of Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) within a sample of Italian trade union delegates and leaders. Subjects priced risky and ambiguous prospects in the domain of gains. Risky prospects were based on games of...

We derive the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for the foreign direct investment (FDI) game played between two unionized firms. We show that FDI is less likely, ceteris paribus, the greater is union bargaining power and the more substitutable are the firms' products in the potential host...

This paper studies the effects of product market integration on wage bargaining institutions. By considering an international Cournot–Nash oligopoly with unionised home firms and non-unionised foreign firms producing substitute goods, the paper shows that the relative size of the home and...

We introduce ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) into a stripped-down version of Alesina's (1987) partisan model of the business cycle. We show that, if the private sector's subjective expectations of future events are ambiguous, there is the possibility of a political business cycle, even when...

We consider a set-up where two governments have either conflicting or matching preferences on the provision of differentiated (local) goods supplied by a common monopoly bureau. We develop a two-stage game. At stage-1, the two governments decide whether or not to merge into a single institution....