In economics, politics and society, examples abound in economics, politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes, i.e., they can collude with a subset of agents. Several contributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually...

Examples abound in economics, politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes, i.e. they can collude with a subset of agents. Several constributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually worsens welfare compared to the...

We consider a game where agents commit to action for two periods. This implies two different patterns of decisions: agents can synchronize or stagger their decisions. We compare the outcomes of both timing patterns, and show that spillovers and strategic interactions are crucial for such a...

[fre] Emploi et négociations salariales dans une union monétaire ouverte par Pierre Cahuc et Hubert Kempf . Cet article étudie l'incidence de modes alternatifs de négociation des salaires, différant par le niveau de centralisation et le profil temporel, dans une union monétaire ouverte, à...

This paper offers a simple approach to study steady-state Markov perfect equilibria arising in dynamic games when players (are obliged to) commit their actions for several periods. It highlights the importance of spillovers and dynamic strategic interactions when assessing the various time...

The paper studies alternative patterns of wage bargaining in an open two-country monetary union. Wages are fixed by trade unions for two periods, either at the national or the monetary union level. It is shown that the best solution with regard to unemployment depends on the nature of...