We present a simple model where bank runs are possible and we analyse the role of subsidization of future investment in this setting. We find that such a policy exacerbates the short-run liquidity problem for banks. Moreover, we highlight that a ‘shift in expectations’ about the keeping of...

We present a simple multiple equilibria model that incorporates the functioning of crony capitalism. We find that a government which is keen to support the interests of the élite is ready to stand the risk of a bank run since this is part of an equilibrium where investments are heavily...

This paper is an attempt to capture the relevance of the relative magnitude of the state and the private sectors in making the transition from central planning more likely to succeed. The basic idea that we introduce is that the growth of the new private sector, in an environment characterized...

The issues of economies in transition have been a central topic in recent macroeconomic modeling. The attention of researchers has concentrated particularly on the speed of transition, and the sequence of restructuring and privatising the state sector. What seems to have been neglected so far...

CESEE banks are reducing foreign funding sources in response to reduced external imbalances, reduced ability to tap international savings, banking group own strategies, initiatives by some regulators, and consistently with uncertainties surrounding the future of the banking union project. In the...

A simple dynamic general-equilibrium model of savings and investment is populated by agents with Kreps-Porteus preferences. Households are heterogeneous in their risk aversion, which explains the negative relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate volatility. Agents trade riskless...

In a beauty contest framework, we show that a more precise public information is welfare enhancing when increasing the precision of private information is costly. The accuracy of public information is chosen by the public authority taking into account that an increase in the precision of public...

We develop a dynamic duopoly, in which firms have to take into account a technological externality, which reduces their innovation costs over time, and an inter-firm spillover, which lowers only the second comer’s R&D costs. This spillover exerts its effect after a disclosure lag. We identify...

We study the welfare implications of public information precision in a beauty contest framework allowing for optimal stabilization policies and information obfuscation. When policy makers’ ability to obfuscate information is constrained, increasing public information precision can be welfare...