We revisit seemingly settled questions of legislative organization, specifying a more general, realistic, informational model than previously. While theorists, unlike empiricists, have commonly inferred that the floor lacks incentive to allow committee influence via gatekeeping, we find...

type="main" xml:id="ecpo12032-abs-0001" <p>Existing theories of legislative delegation feature spatial models in which a principal chooses a single agent to whom to delegate authority. In the canonical model, the ally principle holds – the principal picks the ideologically closest agent. However,...</p>

When something goes awry in a governmental agency, a frequent claim is that appointed political heads are incompetent. If true, what explains this in a separation of powers system where the executive nominates and the legislature approves? Our analysis provides a rationale and conditions for...

Many concerned with how government functions consider creating competition between bureaucracies an attractive option. Others are skeptical of what impact rival agencies have when they are operating within a political context. Reflecting these discrepant viewpoints, some scholars believe that...