This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete contract framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default...

This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete-contracts framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to...

This article integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an optimal contracting framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to...

The rapidly growing literature studying the relationship between legal origin, investor protection, and finance has stimulated an important debate in academic circles. It has also generated a number of applied research projects and strong policy statements. This paper discusses the implications,...

We study the problem of financial contracting between a firm and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts, but assets can be contracted upon. By analyzing the renegotiation between firm and investors in default, we show that a capital structure with multiple investors...

The rapidly growing literature studying the relationship between legal origin, investor protection, and finance has stimulated an important debate in academic circles. It has also generated a number of applied research projects and strong policy statements. This paper discusses the implications,...

This paper analyses in a formal model the problem of achieving financial discipline in a transitional economy with bank-intermediated finance. Even if banks have no intrinsic interest in refinancing unprofitable firms, they may still exploit the softness of government. By gambling for government...

The authors study the problem of financial contracting and renegotiation between a firm and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts but assets can be contracted upon. The authors show that a capital structure with multiple investors specializing in short-term and...