Consider an oligopolistic industry where demand uncertainty resolves after at least one firm has engaged in production. Those firms who produce first behave as simultaneous leaders (co-leaders), whilst those who produce after demand becomes observable will be followers. Each follower simply...

This paper shows an endogenous Stackelberg leader-follower relation that stems purely from commitment, not from chronological order of entry. We consider a symmetric duopoly game with a priori demand uncertainty which resolves after a short term. In the beginning, each supplier is allowed to...

This paper shows the possibility that, under certain conditions, it can be socially optimal for the public firm not to privatise its whole production capacity but to retain a part of it, even when private operation of the production facilities is strictly more cost-efficient than public operation.

We characterise the interplay between oligopolistic firms' strategic decisions in product development, and their incentives for (or against) merger. In an R&D intensive industry where newly developed products can be awarded exclusive patent protection, individual firms' profit maximisation can...