This paper presents the results of two experiments designed to test violations of Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) within a sample of Italian trade union delegates and leaders. Subjects priced risky and ambiguous prospects in the domain of gains. Risky prospects were based on games of...

The authors explore the incentives for governments to cooperate by expanding expenditure. They have three countries: two are in a monetary union (the EMU). The labour markets of both the EMU countries are unionized and there is involuntary unemployment in equilibrium. The authors explore the...

We derive the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for the foreign direct investment (FDI) game played between two unionized firms. We show that FDI is less likely, ceteris paribus, the greater is union bargaining power and the more substitutable are the firms' products in the potential host...

This paper studies the effects of product market integration on wage bargaining institutions. By considering an international Cournot–Nash oligopoly with unionised home firms and non-unionised foreign firms producing substitute goods, the paper shows that the relative size of the home and...

We introduce ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) into a stripped-down version of Alesina's (1987) partisan model of the business cycle. We show that, if the private sector's subjective expectations of future events are ambiguous, there is the possibility of a political business cycle, even when...

We consider a set-up where two governments have either conflicting or matching preferences on the provision of differentiated (local) goods supplied by a common monopoly bureau. We develop a two-stage game. At stage-1, the two governments decide whether or not to merge into a single institution....

This paper presents the results of two experiments designed to test violations of Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) within a sample of Italian trade union delegates and leaders. Subjects priced risky and ambiguous prospects in the domain of gains. Risky prospects were based on games of...

This paper presents a counterexample to the Miyagiwa (1991) claim that discriminatorygovernment procurement policy is ineffective as a protectionist device, when the goods are alsoconsumed by the private sector. The procurement sector is a homogeneous product Cournot-Nashduopoly, with a home and...

This article considers the incidence and welfare effects of a specific excise tax in a unionized duopoly model with differentiated products, linear demand and cost curves, and wage bargaining. The article allows for both Cournot and Bertrand competition. The article shows that unionization...

This paper presents the results of two experiments testing reaction to risk and uncertainty of a sample of 66 Italian university students. Risky prospects were based on games of chance, while uncertain lotteries were based on the forthcoming results of either the May 2001 Italian general...