Using a formal propositional language with operators "individual i assigns probability at least a" for countable many a, we devise an axiom system which is sound and complete with respect to the class of type spaces in the sense of Harsanyi (1967-68). A crucial axiom requires that degrees of...

Maximizing the probability of bypassing an aspiration level, and taking increasing risks to recover previous losses are well-documented behavioral tendencies. They are compatible with individual utility functions that are S-shaped, as suggested in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). We...

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state -contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex-ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibria allocation can be viewed...

Successful individuals were frequently found to be overly optimistic. These finding are puzzling, as one could expect that realists would perform best in the long run. We show, however, that in a large class of strategic interactions of either cooperation or competition, the equilibrium payoffs...

In an economy with asymmetric information, Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) need not become asymptotically incentive compatible, even if many independent replicas of the economy are merged together. We identify a sub-class of REE for which this is nevertheless the case. It consists of...