Using a simple game-theoretical model, this paper analyzes the role of policy advisers in the policy-making process. We show that policy makers are inclined to appoint advisers whose preferences coincide with their own preferences. Furthermore, we show that policy makers are biased towards...

This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of two agency problems. First, it is often hard to ascertain how much effort agents have put in acquiring information. Second, when agents have an interest in the policy outcome, they may manipulate...

To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard...

This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'European Journal of Political Economics', 2004, 20, 255-262.<P> In the literature on electoral politics full convergence of policy platforms is usually regarded as socially optimal. Thereason is that risk-averse voters prefer a sure...</p>

This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953–1993, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic...

In this paper we discuss a recent paper by Stephen E. Haynes in which he relates electoral cycles in political support to electoral cycles in economic variables. Haynes finds that the cycle in support for Republican presidents is explained by the cycle in economic variables, whereas the cycle in...