We consider a new model of a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding in which we make a distinction between the tastes and crowding characteristics of agents. It is possible in this model to have taste-homogeneous jurisdictions that take advantage of the full array of positive...

We introduce a model of an local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite population. Under an especially mild condition of boundedness of per capita payoffs we show nonemptiness of the core of the economy. We then demonstrate that the equal treatment core...

The ``crowding types'' model of a local public goods economy makes a distinction between crowding effects and tastes of agents. Decentralization of the core is possible both with anonymous admission prices that depend only on publicly observable information and, when technology is linear, with...

If one assumes that voters are rational, the most plausible explanation for high voter turnouts seems to be that agents receive benefits from the act of voting itself. We show that public-spirited agents have an evolutionary advantage over those who are not as public-spirited for a range of...

We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two distinguishing characteristics. The first is 'crowding type', which is publicly observable and provides direct costs or benefits to the jurisdiction (coalition or firms) the agent joins. The second is taste...

We consider a model of a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding that distinguishes between the tastes and crowding characteristics of agents. Crowding characteristics are those aspects of an agent that have a direct external effect on other members of the coalition to which he...