We study inference in structural models with a jump in the conditional density, where location and size of the jump are described by regression curves. Two prominent examples are auction models, where the bid density jumps from zero to a positive value at the lowest cost, and equilibrium...

This paper develops a framework for performing estimation and inference in econometric models with partial identification, focusing particularly on models characterized by moment inequalities and equalities. Applications of this framework include the analysis of game-theoretic models, revealed...

In this paper, we study the identification and estimation of a dynamic discrete game allowing for discrete or continuous state variables. We first provide a general nonparametric identification result under the imposition of an exclusion restriction on agent payoffs. Next we analyze large sample...

We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games with complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss, a discrete game is defined to be a generalization of a standard discrete choice model in which utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms that...

We develop econometric models of ascending (English) auctions which allow for both bidder asymmetries as well as common and/or private value components in bidders' underlying valuations We show that the equilibrium inverse bid functions in each round of the auction are implicitly defined...

We develop a new estimation methodology for dynamic optimization models with unobserved state variables Our approach is semiparametric in the sense of not requiring explicit parametric assumptions to be made concerning the distribution of these unobserved state variables We propose a two-step...

We empirically measure the effects of increasing competition on equilibrium bidding in procurement auctions In common-value auctions the winner's curse counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases First we estimate the structural parameters of an equilibrium bidding...

industry structure.