Niskanen's model has been largely criticized, but it still remains a standard explanation of bureaucracy's behaviour. In this paper we criticize the monopoly power that Niskanen assigns to the bureaucracy. A bilateral monopoly between bureaucrats and politicians might be a much more adequate...

The present paper analyzes competitive coordination games from a public choice approach. In these, agents may engage in a rent-seeking competition for norms, which redefines property rights and has redistributive effects. For a binary population, the work shows that rent dissipation will depend...

This timely and important volume addresses the serious challenges faced by democracy in contemporary society. With contributions from some of the world’s most prestigious scholars of public choice and political science, this comprehensive collection presents a complete overview of the threats...

This timely and important volume addresses the serious challenges faced by democracy in contemporary society. With contributions from some of the world’s most prestigious scholars of public choice and political science, this comprehensive collection presents a complete overview of the...

In this major book an internationally acclaimed group of scholars examines theoretical and applied topics of particular relevance to public choice analysis.

Niskanen's model has been largely criticized, but it still remains a standard explanation of bureaucracy's behaviour. In this paper we criticize the monopoly power that Niskanen assigns to the bureaucracy. A bilateral monopoly between bureaucrats and politicians might be a much more adequate...

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.

Nash equilibrium is the point of departure of most of the standard literature on public goods. This stresses the sub-optimality of voluntary contributions towards the provision of a public good: in game theoretic terms, with unboundedly rational agents, individual best response is no cooperation...

This work aims at connecting developments in the theory of agency and implicit contracts with research on bounded rationality and agent based computational models. These are two related areas as implicit contracts are justified on the basis of bounded rationality, which additionally is one of...

We sketch here the basis of a behavioral theory of non-market decision making or collective action. Departing from the basic social problem, the coordination of individual actions when individual rationality is opposed to collective rationality, we model a population of agents choosing their...