We study second price auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values where bidders' signals for the value are independently and identically distributed. We also prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among all standard auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values.

We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that...

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...

We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals.

In this study we demonstrate how a reference price may affect the degree of price rigidity|flexibility. For this, we construct a model of reference-price formation, which we use to analyze the effect of asymmetric reference price (cut 'effects') on the profitability of price promotions. We...

We study contests where several privately informed agents bid for a price. All bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids, and, moreover, bids may be capped. We show that, regardless of the number of bidders, if agents have linear or concave cost functions then...